



Governments are struggling to limit global temperatures below the 2°C Paris target with 2 
existing climate change policy approaches. This is because conventional climate policies have 3 
been predominantly (inter)nationally top-down, which limits citizen agency in driving policy 4 
change and influencing citizen behavior. Here we propose elevating Citizen Social Science 5 
(CSS) to a new level across governments as an advanced collaborative approach of accelerating 6 
climate action and policies that moves beyond conventional citizen science and participatory 7 
approaches. Moving beyond the traditional science-policy model of the democratization of 8 
science in enabling more inclusive climate policy change, we present examples of how CSS 9 
can potentially transform citizen behavior and enable citizens to become key agents in driving 10 
climate policy change. We also discuss the barriers that could impede the implementation of 11 
CSS and offer solutions to these. In doing this, we articulate the implications of increased 12 
citizen action through CSS in moving forward the broader normative and political program of 13 
transdisciplinary and co-productive climate change research and policy. 14 
 15 
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This paper examines why current forms of climate policy are not working and offers some 27 
suggestions as to how to further increase citizen engagement in science and policy decisions at 28 
different scales of governance that move beyond tokenistic forms of citizen participation. We 29 
offer a framework for what we call ‘citizen social science’ (CSS), highlighting the various 30 
social, political and institutional barriers that prevent greater citizen participation in climate 31 
science and policy decisions. We then present some suggestions as to how CSS can potentially 32 
be used to overcome these barriers to enable citizens to contribute more effectively and directly 33 
to ambitious formal climate policy goals. 34 
 35 
Citizen participatory issues with current forms of climate policy-making 36 
National governments make top-down climate policy decisions that often involve little input 37 
from lay citizens. Consequently, when it is time for a policy to be implemented there can be 38 
public resistance to it or lack of uptake. The challenge, therefore, is not only to make climate 39 
policy more robust, but to also further democratize citizen involvement in policy formulation 40 
to increase uptake. There have been repeated calls for increased citizen engagement, 41 
understanding individual behavior, and greater channels of communication between different 42 
stakeholders in both scientific and policy discourses related to climate change that move 43 
beyond mere public acceptance of the physical evidence of climate change (Beniston, 2013; 44 
Carvalho et al., 2017; Lassen et al., 2011; Schweizer et al., 2013; Sörqvist, 2016; Sprain and 45 
Reinig, 2018; Swart et al., 2014). It is never more imperative that the forms and structures of 46 
citizen engagement in climate science and policy decisions remain central to climate action 47 
given that the Paris Agreement will afford non-state actors (e.g. private and third sector groups) 48 
more influence in formal policy implementation (Kuyper et al., 2018; Van Asselt, 2016). The 49 
latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report (Global Warming of 50 
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1.5 °C an IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming of, 3) has emphasized how the 51 
“strengthening of capacities for climate action of national and sub-national authorities, civil 52 
society, the private sector, Indigenous peoples and local communities” is key to achieving 53 
ambitious climate policy goals that will limit warming below 1.5°C by 2100. But citizens and 54 
institutions must act together, now. 55 
 56 
However, democratically legitimizing increased citizen engagement within current 57 
institutional structures is complex given how such structures demarcate lay citizens from 58 
scientific experts and/or government (Miller and Rose, 2017). Even polycentric climate 59 
governance systems that are supposed to incorporate private and third sector groups into policy 60 
decisions suffer from orchestration from particular government (state) actors, resulting in 61 
systematic governance experimentation and learning being stifled (Abbott, 2017). 62 
Furthermore, communication practices often exist between citizens, scientific experts and/or 63 
government that constrain increased citizen engagement in climate change policy formulation 64 
and implementation (Carvalho et al., 2017). Hence, the governance crisis of the sustainability 65 
paradigm continues (Peters, 2017), where states continue to dominate the international political 66 
discourse of climate change through particular modes of governmentality and sovereignty 67 
(Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2016; Kythreotis, 2012), ostracizing citizens within the climate 68 
policy process and thus delimiting greater citizen participation in helping achieving ambitious 69 
climate policy goals made by formal policy actors like the state. 70 
 71 
Increased lay citizen participation in climate science and policy decisions can limit the 72 
influence of institutional expertise in democratic spaces that often do not speak for the majority 73 
of citizens (Sprain and Reinig, 2018). Given the limitations in citizen science translating to 74 
effective climate action (Groulx et al., 2017), we argue that increased public engagement in the 75 
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‘politics of science’ (Jasanoff, 2003) and what we call the ‘politics of policy’ (how policy is 76 
politicized by governments) can help protect against public misinformation on climate change, 77 
prevent particular forms of epistemic expertise dominating climate science-policy decisions, 78 
producing more transparently public-engaged climate politics and policy. In this sense, citizens 79 
can become active agents of policy change through their actions, rather than being just part of 80 
a wider normative political participatory process dominated by state policy discourses that have 81 
predominantly politicized climate science and policy (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2016; 82 
Lövbrand et al., 2015). 83 
 84 
The Paris Agreement aims for an ambitious and transformational era of international climate 85 
change policy (Kinley, 2016). However, limiting global temperatures to below 2°C by 2100 is 86 
governed by techno-managerial language and policy responses to fossil fuel derived energy 87 
production (Hoffert et al., 2002; Hoffmann, 2011) rather than identifying lay peoples’ 88 
concerns, values and goals for their communities. Framing the climate problem in this more 89 
personal way can promote more transformational engagement and ownership in climate 90 
decision-making (Leach et al., 2010; Nisbet, 2009), especially given that some research has 91 
shown how non-specialists find it difficult to understand how physical climate risks can impact 92 
their lives (Pidgeon and Fischhoff, 2011). Failure to consider citizens’ concerns undermines 93 
the legitimacy of formal climate policy decisions, limiting the ability of citizens to play a more 94 
influential role in instigating policy change through citizen action. Interdisciplinary co-95 
produced research is needed between citizens, scientists and policymakers to span knowledge 96 
and spatial boundaries through wider citizen engagement and to produce research that speaks 97 
to its end users (Editorial, 2018; Howarth et al., 2018; Kirchhoff et al., 2013; Lemos et al., 98 
2012; Turnhout et al., 2016). Yet, co-production has multiple meanings (Bremer and Meisch, 99 
2017). However, for citizens to have more influential participation, they need to understand 100 
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how the current science-policy process works with respect to the roles of research and policy 101 
actors. This could enable pro-environmental decisions, behavior and actions that complement 102 
the science-policy process. With support from other state and non-state institutions, we argue 103 
that citizens can become transformative agents of social and policy change with respect to 104 
climate change through CSS. 105 
 106 
New citizen-centred solutions are needed in climate politics for triggering deliberate social 107 
transformations and for providing a deeper inquiry into the structures and processes within 108 
society and science (O’Brien, 2012). Such solutions should be based upon social assemblages 109 
(Gillard et al., 2016) and citizen agency (Dodman and Mitlin, 2013), rather than overreliance 110 
on governments to catalyze transformational change. The withdrawal of the Trump 111 
administration from the Paris Agreement in June 2017 has demonstrated how individual nation 112 
states still hold the balance of power in determining policy outcomes for climate change 113 
(Kythreotis, 2015). Societal transformations can be addressed to some extent by ‘polycentric’ 114 
governance where non-state actors support global policy-making by working across policy 115 
scales to redress the limitations of single scale (e.g. solely national) policies. However, national 116 
and international climate politics continues to play a dominant role in the polycentric 117 
governance systems and research has only just begun to distinguish between different types of 118 
climate governance, rather than assessing their effectiveness in complementing or replacing 119 
top-down, government dominated policy-making (Jordan et al., 2015). This all points to a need 120 
for increased citizen engagement to act as a further check and balance to formal climate policy 121 
decisions that are made in particular spaces dominated by epistemic actors like the state, 122 
scientists or even the market (e.g. fossil fuel companies). This certainly will produce a more 123 
reflexive ‘knowledge politics’ on climate change that can help circumvent uneven spaces of 124 
climate decision-making (Mahony and Hulme, 2018). 125 
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Elevating citizen engagement 126 
Whilst there is some evidence of successful government- and market-led policy transitions 127 
towards cleaner energy and lower emissions (e.g. Obama, 2017), many citizens are left out of 128 
this process highlighting an urgent need to engage citizens more closely with framing the 129 
climate and energy debate, in addition to concentrating on private sector transitions through 130 
market forces that then shape government policy. Rather than thinking about possible 131 
economically sympathetic policy solutions for climate change originating from governments, 132 
policy-makers and/or even the market, the citizen has to take a more active social role in driving 133 
policy change and implementation for both mitigation (e.g. energy use) and adaptation (coping 134 
with climate impacts).  However, doing this successfully requires greater interaction between 135 
climate researchers and citizens. This involves developing ways in which the everyday citizen 136 
can understand the way in which climate policy is constructed within and by governments 137 
through the traditional science-policy model where truth (e.g. science) speaks to power (e.g. 138 
policy choice) (Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998). Enlightening the citizen to how climate research 139 
is conducted (and why) firstly gives them an ideal platform from which to react to and then 140 
drive new government policies that could meet the speed of transitional change needed to limit 141 
global temperatures and avoid dangerous climate impacts. For example, research on climate 142 
adaptation has shown the importance of joint-problem framing and knowledge production, 143 
especially in contexts where scientific knowledge – whether social, economic, political or 144 
environmental – is limited or scarce (Huggel et al., 2015; Swart et al., 2014). 145 
 146 
Although increased citizen engagement with climate research is not a full alternative to top-147 
down political agreements or technological change, it can certainly catalyze the speed and 148 
ambition of the technological, social, political and economic changes required to meet 149 
collective climate commitments regarding mitigation and adaptation. Policy-makers and 150 
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scientists have a duty to create local spaces where citizens can more fully participate further in 151 
related climate decision-making processes as a form of power brokerage (Howarth et al., 2018; 152 
Pielke, 2007). Yet, communicating climate research and policy to the general public has many 153 
challenges (Bernauer and McGrath, 2016; Hollin and Pearce, 2015). It is possible to perceive 154 
climate information without any values affecting it (i.e., bias is always there) (Corner et al., 155 
2012). Greater citizen involvement in climate decisions within the more science-policy process 156 
could help ameliorate climate misinformation dominating political discourses on climate 157 
change. Recent research has shown how key scientific experts have a central role in utilizing 158 
knowledge networks within the formal science-policy process to catalyze climate adaptation 159 
action (Kettle et al., 2017), so by making their role more open to the everyday citizen, climate 160 
scientists (experts) can augment greater co-production practices between citizens, scientists 161 
and government policy-makers. 162 
 163 
More integrative and effective climate action and policy can come about when citizens and the 164 
public are fully cognizant of the implications of their actions and behavior towards their (local) 165 
environment when presented with how both the science on climate change is generated by 166 
experts and used by policy-makers. This reduces miscommunication and confusion of climate 167 
science and creates the conditions where the relationship between citizen behavior, science and 168 
polices are fully transparent. This could trigger an inclination of citizens, scientists and policy-169 
makers to want to foster integrative change rather than the current often benign, top-down and 170 
apolitical reactions to climate policy change as merely a government/state responsibility. 171 
Citizens can then act as political agents of change by increasing pressure on their elected 172 
representatives to help enable such policy change at higher state levels, rather than citizens just 173 




Citizen Social Science: moving beyond Citizen Science 176 
Citizen Science (CS) as a methodological tool for understanding large scale processes has 177 
burgeoned, arguably as a reaction to the use of particular forms of epistemic expertise that have 178 
traditionally and unilaterally contributed to policy decisions (Haas, 1992), rather than 179 
consideration of more diverse, but contextual knowledges and forms of social knowing (Irwin, 180 
1995). Citizens can be utilized to obtain larger datasets that enable researchers to assist policy-181 
making practice, democratizing expertise into more formal policy processes (Fischer, 1993). 182 
To December 2018 there are 57 active and searchable CS projects related to climate change 183 
that are listed on the Scistarter website (Scistarter, 2018). All of these projects involve citizens 184 
observing and collecting data, rather than formulating the CS research methods, analysing and 185 
interpreting the data as a means to instigate climate policy action. By acting  as volunteers, 186 
citizens are important for data collection to inform climate research (Bonney et al., 2014; Lahoz 187 
and Schneider, 2014) as a means to understand trends, causes, impacts, and responses to, 188 
climate change (Savo et al., 2016). Climate research, however, requires complex tools, such as 189 
models, remote sensing, and ice core and soil analyses to better inform broader policy, and 190 
such skills are often beyond the capabilities of lay citizens. Broader policy actors have 191 
attempted to further engage citizens more. For example, the United Nations Framework 192 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Secretariat through collective nations, have 193 
recognized the potential of CS and have assisted in initiating and implementing large citizen 194 
consultations on climate change (Bedsted et al., 2015). However, there is also a need to 195 
engender links between local policy actors and the communities they serve, particularly with 196 
respect to climate adaptation (Vogel and Henstra, 2015). So, a question remains whether CS 197 
could be used more effectively to further engage different citizens and communities for more 198 
tailored local climate policy beyond crowdsourcing to obtain large(r) data sets? There is 199 
evidence of governments and municipalities working better to include traditional and local 200 
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knowledge into their governance systems (Leonard et al., 2013) but more work is needed to 201 
further integrate citizen action and climate policy-making. 202 
 203 
CS has also been traditionally classified into various types, the most relevant for this paper 204 
being Haklay’s distinction below in Table 1 between: crowdsourcing (level 1), distributed 205 
intelligence (level 2), participatory science (level 3) and extreme CS (level 4) (Haklay, 2013). 206 
Haklay’s distinctions show CS as a collaborative and participatory framework that enables 207 
citizens to assist in big data collection for scientific purposes. CS therefore, has many 208 
advantages for climate mitigation and adaptation practice and policy (Ford et al., 2016b; Larsen 209 
and Gunnarsson-Östling, 2009). Yet we argue for a new platform (see level 5) whereby citizens 210 
have increased influence within conventional science-policy and participatory frameworks in 211 
shaping climate policy, alongside the necessary technical (e.g. negative emissions technology) 212 
and policy (a shift from the ‘green growth’ paradigm) changes that are required (Anderson, 213 
2015).  214 






































(Level 5)  ‘Citizen Social Science’  Citizens as key agents of 
research, action AND policy 
change at ALL levels of 
engagement and scales of the 
decision-making process 
Level 4  ‘Extreme Citizen 
Science’ 
 Collaborative science – 
problem definition, data 
collection and analysis 
Level 3 ‘Participatory Science’  Participation in problem 
definition and data collection 
Level 2 ‘Distributed 
Intelligence’ 
• Citizens as basic interpreters  
 Volunteered thinking 
Level 1 ‘Crowdsourcing’ • Citizens as sensors  
 Volunteered computing 
 216 
Though the term ‘citizen social science’ has been previously used in the literature (Purdam, 217 
2014), the way in which it has been explained has remained confined within the paradigm of 218 
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using CS to create large data sets for policy-making. We define CSS further as representing 219 
new methodological and theoretical territory that resonates with more diverse and 220 
heterogeneous forms of social knowing, values and cultures of citizens beyond CS (Castree et 221 
al., 2014). While CS uses citizens as policy passive objects for research in conducting 222 
measurements for big data sets, our proposed CSS framework makes citizens co-learners within 223 
the research process by actively enabling them to explore transformatively changing 224 
institutionalized research and policy systems. CSS embraces the principles of a ‘Two-Eyed 225 
Seeing’ approach in an Indigenous and scientific knowledge systems context; where a co-226 
learning journey (where citizens take a lead, often over government/policymakers, in making 227 
decisions about how best to formulate policy) is encouraged for more transdisciplinary research 228 
and to bring together different ways of knowing (Bartlett et al., 2012). One way of 229 
differentiating CSS from CS is therefore to consider this ‘two-eyed seeing’ approach that 230 
repositions citizens as central co-learners that can widen the climate science evidence-base to 231 
a more holistic understanding of perspectives for the benefit of all. Recent research has 232 
illustrated how blending scientific and traditional knowledges through citizen co-learning 233 
highlighted key environmental stressors under uncertainty (Mantyka-Pringle et al., 2017). 234 
Hence, this demonstrates the difference between citizens getting involved in public 235 
engagement exercises within formal policy processes and apparatus, and citizens being 236 
catalysts and drivers of climate policy transformation. With public engagement, participants 237 
often work within pre-conceived state ideas and traditional governance structures that are 238 
institutionally entrenched in top-down power dynamics (e.g. a particular policy standpoint 239 
based on ideology) (Morrison et al., 2017) designed to protect the political economy status-240 
quo. Co-production or co-learning through CSS moves beyond conventional public 241 
engagement and makes the citizens initiate action and policy responses based on their specific 242 
forms of social knowing and values. This organic form of bottom-up collaborative knowledge-243 
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making can help to eliminate any cultural issues and insensitivities that may emerge upscale 244 
when formulating policies. It can also catalyze transformative change through the eyes of 245 
everyday citizens by allowing them to be exposed to climate policy decisions that they would 246 
not normally be involved or interested in. Therefore, CSS is underpinned by multiple 247 
disciplines and methods of co-production enabling citizens to make more context specific, 248 
transparent and explicit contribution to climate policy-making and action.  249 
Barriers and (potential) solutions to implementing CSS 250 
While we argue that implementing CSS at a larger scale is key for achieving Paris climate 251 
commitments, there are a number of barriers to successfully implementing CSS effectively. 252 
The following is a suggested approach to begin dealing with such barriers. Working towards 253 
more integrative and effective climate change solutions between citizens and policy-makers 254 
involves developing a profound understanding of the complex interactions between those 255 
different actors with the physical, social, economic and political world that leads to decisional 256 
conflict and policy inertia over climate change. This requires changing the ‘decision 257 
environment’ as a means to circumvent or at least ameliorate some of these institutionalized 258 
barriers (Howden et al., 2007).  259 
 260 
1. Reframing the climate change problem 261 
Most citizens often feel disengaged and unable to influence policy, including climate change 262 
policy, or to significantly change their lifestyles to tackle climate change for a range of 263 
institutional, social and psychological reasons (Hoppner and Whitmarsh, 2010). As a collective 264 
problem, climate change can feel overwhelming and individuals lack self-efficacy to act 265 
(Koletsou and Mancy, 2012). Prevailing social norms to consume and lack of trust in 266 
governments or other people to take action also erodes motivation to act (Whitmarsh et al., 267 
2010). For many, climate change (policy) also threatens assumptions about quality of life, 268 
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fairness, progress and individual freedom, leading to political and ideological division in 269 
responding to the issue. However, citizen engagement in policy and behavioral change is more 270 
likely to occur if issues are framed around audience values and more local and tangible 271 
concerns; and if individuals believe their actions make a difference (Whitmarsh et al., 2010). 272 
For example, at the individual level, giving people feedback on their energy use via energy 273 
displays can encourage energy conservation behavior (Darby, 2006); while acting as an 274 
organization, community or city can give people a sense of collective efficacy to address global 275 
problems like climate change (Sweetman and Whitmarsh, 2016). Framing climate change as a 276 
local issue may help engage individual citizens if they feel a sense of place attachment 277 
(Devine-Wright, 2013), although this might also undermine the perceived severity of the issue 278 
(Brügger et al., 2015). Framing climate change in terms of impacts and adaptation is less likely 279 
to threaten citizens (including those on the right-of-centre) than mitigation messages, which 280 
tend to imply individual sacrifice (e.g., reducing energy use (Howell et al., 2016); while other 281 
frames (e.g., reducing waste) and focussing on co-benefits of action (e.g., health, social 282 
cohesion) may also be more engaging across the political spectrum (Whitmarsh and Corner, 283 
2017). 284 
 285 
Reframing the problem also requires a need to reconsider the role of gender and cultural 286 
equality. Climate change is more likely to adversely impact Indigenous people and women due 287 
to their increased vulnerability (Halton, 2018; IPCC, 2014). For instance, we know that climate 288 
change is having disproportionate effects on the human health of Indigenous people globally 289 
(Ford et al., 2010; Green et al., 2009). Calls have also been made for better representation of 290 
Indigenous knowledge and Indigenous issues in IPCC assessments and other global climate 291 
policy (Ford et al., 2016a, 2016c; Mantyka-Pringle et al., 2015). There are obvious gender 292 
differences in environmental concerns and attitudes and impacts (McCright, 2010), 293 
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particularly in developing countries. For example, two-thirds of the female labour force 294 
dependent on agricultural work in developing countries are adversely affected by poor harvest, 295 
which leads to food, income and health security issues (UN WomenWatch). To address the 296 
current imbalances, more cultural and gender sensitive responses are required to create the 297 
social and political conditions needed to address climate-related problems. The most obvious 298 
way to catalyze equality is by creating scientific and policy pathways that enable increased 299 
involvement of Indigenous people and women in the science-policy realm. This needs to be 300 
addressed from the local to international scale (Gay-Antaki and Liverman, 2018). The values 301 
innate to CSS promotes gender and cultural equality in climate change by providing an 302 
inclusive and integrative framework by which women and Indigenous people are supported to 303 
engage with climate research, policy and taking relevant action. However, there needs to be a 304 
degree of top-down support from the science-policy realm to normalize such local gender and 305 
cultural equality in climate decisions through CSS. If scientific and policy expert communities 306 
do not reflect on gender and cultural imbalances, then how would we expect women and 307 
Indigenous citizens to take a lead on climate action in their own communities through CSS? If 308 
this two-way process is facilitated, financially supported, and mainstreamed then there would 309 
be a greater chance of women and Indigenous citizens being more empowered to 310 
transformatively act on their own behalf through CSS (Alston, 2014). 311 
 312 
Transformative responses through CSS do not assume a particular scientific approach and 313 
therefore must begin with a discussion of participants’ values, based on their moral, aesthetic, 314 
experiential, spiritual knowledge concerns and aspirations rather than policy being solely 315 
foisted upon citizens in a top-down way. Yet there must be a heterogeneity of climate responses 316 
from all areas of society – governments, scientists and citizens who have been previously 317 
apathetic to climate change. This process leads to a recognition that there are communal values 318 
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held by citizens that can serve as a bridge towards an overarching global climate policy goal, 319 
like the 2°C Paris target. Discussions about fears and hopes for the future can provide a ‘lens’ 320 
through which to discuss climate change research and to explore different narratives and 321 
pathways for public engagement that move beyond current techno-managerial and gender 322 
imbalanced science-policy approaches.  323 
 324 
2. ‘Conflicts of interest’.  325 
 326 
Whilst we recognise that conflicts of interest will endure between different stakeholders in 327 
making appropriate climate decisions, it is nevertheless omnipresent in the current climate 328 
science-policy process. There are a number of existing groups of citizens with conflicts of 329 
interest related to climate change science. The most obvious are climate deniers and citizens 330 
that benefit from or are dependent on the fossil fuel industry for their livelihood. It is possible 331 
that these groups may choose to be involved in CSS to impose their views or advance their 332 
standpoint to reaching their political objectives such as undermining or misrepresenting the 333 
science behind climate change (Editorial, 2015). In the application of CS, it has been reported 334 
that there remain limitations in CS enabling local climate actions (Groulx et al., 2017). These 335 
types of conflicts of interest may also be experienced in CSS and need to be taken into account 336 
or at the very least acknowledged so that the process will not be skewed in favor of one 337 
standpoint, and therefore remain representative. However, we are cognizant that any policy 338 
decisions should not be taken on the basis of the equal representation of all views (as some 339 
views are obviously extreme in ideology, anarchic and/or reject observed scientific facts) but 340 
on the basis of the scientific knowledge which solves or mitigates the real problem.  341 
 342 
Less obvious conflicts of interest also exist in some cultural contexts (e.g. different ways of 343 
understanding and valuing the environment), inequality (e.g. class) and ethno-national 344 
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diversity conflicts (e.g. land ownership conflicts with Indigenous vs non-Indigenous groups). 345 
A potential solution is to ensure that there is a representative sample of the population in the 346 
process and citizens’ backgrounds are respectfully vetted beforehand. Where there are 347 
conflicts of interest between people, the process of CSS acts as a mediation channel to bridge 348 
polarized views through a common purpose. It enables new narratives to be explored as 349 




3. CSS cannot be implemented as a ‘one size fits all’ knowledge framework  354 
 355 
We are cognizant that CSS can only work if the knowledge domain of citizens is germane to 356 
their everyday life. For example, rural farmers should not find themselves working or co-357 
researching on urban transport issues and urban citizens should not find themselves working 358 
on agricultural issues unless they hold real knowledge in that area to enable more effective 359 
action and policy. Apart from the intimate knowledge that some citizens have with their natural 360 
surroundings (e.g. Indigenous traditional knowledge), much of modern life involves epistemic 361 
dependence on trained experts. The limits of lay knowledge (and particularly lay expertise) in 362 
matters of climate change are therefore restricted (Dunlap and McCright, 2015). Low carbon 363 
housing and civil engineering projects are classic examples because the majority of citizens 364 
are users of pre-made structures they could not design without being trained in engineering 365 
science. So there is a caveat about how far CSS can extend in a ‘rule of experts’ context. The 366 
uniqueness of the CSS framework is within the way in which infrastructure is used through 367 
our behavioral patterns, which is predicated upon how citizens make sense of different forms 368 
of knowledges to inform their actions as a means to make real transformative change. Greater 369 
government acceptance of citizen potential is needed to quell those hidden assumptions of 370 
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people not mattering, or not being educated enough to make informed decisions. CSS can 371 
expose and ameliorate these hidden assumptions. This is where allying of citizens with 372 
knowledge-brokers plays a significant role. The Climate Knowledge Brokers Group (Climate 373 
Knowledge Brokers, 2017) is an excellent example of how citizens can get further involved in 374 
understanding the causes and consequences of climatic change and to create a focal point for 375 
diverse citizen voices to be heard regarding climate change. In this sense there is a need to 376 
move beyond scientists merely having to consider the types of idealized roles they have to play 377 
in public policy and politics beyond the science-policy process (Pielke, 2007). Scientists and 378 
experts have to consider what role they can play in more openly engaging with citizens as a 379 
means to help citizens determine the types of knowledge that can inform policy decisions made 380 
by government (and vice versa). This will then more democratically legitimize citizen 381 
involvement in policy-making by placing citizens at the centre of new policy formulations, 382 
rather than politicizing the role of science and scientists in public policy and politics. 383 
 384 
4. Uneven power relationships  385 
Making citizens more central within the science-policy process is inevitably constrained by 386 
pre-existing uneven power relationships between politicians and citizens, scientists and 387 
citizens, and scientists and politicians. These silo relationships are often defined through 388 
different vested interests, rigid funding and reporting structures, lack of communication skills 389 
among researchers and their (subconscious) beliefs about the lack of skills and critical 390 
awareness of ‘the masses’ (Burgess et al., 2017). The barriers to greater citizen involvement 391 
because of lack of voice, visibility or opportunity are often formidable and there needs to be 392 
more active integration between lay citizens, climate researchers and policy-makers. 393 
Currently, important political arenas for climate policy decisions like UNFCCC Conference 394 
of the Parties have been dominated by national governments and closed-off to the lay citizen. 395 
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While lay citizens often (rightfully) demonstrate at such climate negotiations, there remains a 396 
physical and political barrier between where state-led political decisions are made and the 397 
equitable and just contribution that citizens should make to the climate change political 398 
process, as recent research on the Paris Conference of the Parties has shown (Weisser and 399 
Müller-Mahn, 2016).  400 
 401 
Uneven power relationships also exist between scientists and citizens. Scientists are 402 
constrained by how they can approach their research methodology and data collection based 403 
on rigid reporting structures of their institutions and funding bodies. Although research bodies 404 
such as Research Councils UK and the National Science Foundation (US) now require research 405 
projects to demonstrate the impact of their work to beneficiaries outside of academia (NSF; 406 
RCUK, 2014) and data/publications of their research as Open Access (NSF, 2015; RCUK, 407 
2017), there are no specific requirements to involve citizens directly in the co-production of 408 
research (even though we are cognizant that more theoretical science may not require co-409 
production research with citizens). However, climate research certainly does given that the 410 
anthropogenic climate change problem can be reduced to human behaviour (Karl and 411 
Trenberth, 2003). Additionally, scientists’ biases have been demonstrated in citizen science 412 
projects where certain data sources are favored over others (e.g. based on the 413 
background/education level of the data collectors). This suggests a belief that citizens do not 414 
possess the necessary knowledge or data collection skills to perform robust science to the 415 
standards of scientific ‘experts’ (Burgess et al., 2017). 416 
 417 
There are also uneven power relationships between scientists and governments. 418 
Notwithstanding the systemic problem of not enough research professionals and academics 419 
being able to work with government regardless of discipline to engender evidence-based policy 420 
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(Lawrence et al., 2016), with respect to climate change research, many of the broader science-421 
policy arenas in which scientists can contribute to climate action and/or policy-making (albeit 422 
in a policy-neutral way) like in the IPCC Assessment Reports, continues to be tainted with a 423 
‘closed club’ syndrome for many academics (Hulme and Mahony, 2010; Shackley, 1997), a 424 
pronounced gender imbalance in IPCC membership (Gay-Antaki and Liverman, 2018), and 425 
scientist contributions to Summary for Policy-makers (SPM) reports have to go through a final 426 
review of government approval of the SPM line (IPCC, 2015). Equally important, certain 427 
academics continue to be ostracized in IPCC decisions and processes where the impacts of 428 
climate change are felt most (e.g. developing countries) leading to a science-policy information 429 
deficit and institutionalized epistemic communities, even though there have been attempts to 430 
make the IPCC more ‘user-friendly’ (Corbera et al., 2016; Petersen et al., 2015). 431 
 432 
More resources and institutional support are essential to help engage citizens in bottom-up 433 
processes that complement and inspire change through existing research and political 434 
institutions. CSS needs to be achieved through strategies targeted to different value systems 435 
that are not typically related to climate change like biospheric ones (Howell and Allen, 2017). 436 
This will have positive economic and social spillover effects beyond environmental benefits, 437 
especially in vulnerable communities (e.g. added skills and cash incentives). Governments 438 
stand to gain from increased citizen engagement in research in times of austerity (Dickinson et 439 
al., 2012) and the private sector can enhance their corporate social responsibility by supporting 440 
employees in CSS projects. There is a need to move climate research towards a more 441 
collaborative role in which it is co-produced by citizens, industry, decision-makers and 442 
scientists so that the research has stronger outreach and generates more effective policies 443 
(Pearce et al., 2009). But which sectors are best placed to catalyze CSS projects? The public, 444 
private and/or third sectors? A possible starting point we argue is that maybe universities are 445 
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best placed to initiate and facilitate such CSS projects. They are not so much impartial as 446 
designed, in principle, to serve the interests of publics. Rather, they provide a range of 447 
knowledge and invention that pluralizes options and speaks to an array of cognitive, moral, 448 
aesthetic and spiritual positions existing in the world. Research has shown that those with a 449 
higher education share more cultural commonalities over global climate change (Crona et al., 450 
2013). Whilst we are aware of the new instrumentalism in universities linked to business and 451 
government control, we feel universities could be best placed to initiate and facilitate CSS in 452 
comparison to the private, public and/or third sectors. 453 
 454 
5. Differences across and within countries (scale)  455 
The deployment of CSS will face varied challenges across different countries and within the 456 
scalar jurisdictions of each country. CSS is plausibly easier to deploy in democratic political 457 
systems that have a commitment and track record of fostering public participation in 458 
environmental and other areas of decision-making. For example, commitments to broad 459 
principles supporting the CSS deployment have been made under the Aarhus Convention of 460 
1998 and in the European Union Directives on Public Participation (2003/35/EC) and Access 461 
to Environmental Information (2003/4/EC) as well as many other more specific directives such 462 
as the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC). However, the prospects of CSS deployment 463 
are less obvious in non-democratic countries where political leadership is not representative or 464 
accountable, public participation is not legitimate or encouraged, and where political freedoms 465 
are curtailed, and civil society organizations do not welcome freedom of speech.  466 
 467 
There are also challenges for CSS within countries at different scalar jurisdictions depending 468 
on the system of government and the various powers attributed to government at different 469 
jurisdictional scales. Levels of political autonomy and a willingness to embrace more 470 
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networked and polycentric governance with respect to climate change can result in a failure of 471 
knowledge upscaling if citizens are not equipped to deal with the ‘politics of scale’. This 472 
especially comes into play when citizens with only their local experience(s) are asked to speak 473 
as ‘researchers’ on national or global issues. But CSS would not exclude these diverse 474 
knowledges, but rather warn cautiousness during implementation and acknowledge that there 475 
are caveats about how far CSS can extend in a ‘rule of experts’ context across different spatial 476 
jurisdictions. This has been acknowledged in the literature regarding the problems of political 477 
power and scale when trying to implement more networked forms of climate governance 478 
(Morrison et al., 2017) through social knowing. 479 
 480 
One possible solution is to give local citizens greater participatory influence in local processes 481 
of governance and policy-making and forming stronger links between communities and local 482 
policy-makers. For making local climate decisions, one example could be to employ an opinion 483 
poll company to choose the citizens to participate in local consultation processes, much like is 484 
done with citizen juries. By providing selected citizens with knowledge on climate research 485 
and how policy is constructed, citizens become more actively engaged in policy and can 486 
deliberate the type of policies to be utilized by local/national governments through ‘mini 487 
publics’. This has proved successful in Ireland, where a nationwide exercise in deliberative 488 
democracy demonstrated that citizens with limited initial knowledge become ‘enlightened’ 489 
(Suiter et al., 2016) and more likely to change their minds on salient issues based on the best 490 
available evidence. Other novel ways of eliciting public opinion and engaging them include 491 
citizen awards/incentives for new ideas that promote climate action within the community, and 492 
citizen draws that allow citizens time off work to volunteer in local and state council meetings 493 
related to climate change (similar to jury duty, but without the legal powers). With citizens 494 
enjoying a more central role in helping to determine formal policy, government still has an 495 
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important enabling role to play by investing more in financial and human resources. This can 496 
then more clearly align the roles that citizens and government authorities play in the policy 497 
process, promoting a more transparent bottom-up approach to climate-related co-planning 498 
issues (Mees et al., 2017). This further bridges the gap between how climate change is governed 499 
by citizens, governments and the market across international, national and local jurisdictions. 500 
Particularly at the local scale though, CSS could provide more active engagement by bringing 501 
citizens into the pre-consultation phase during policy development, rather than citizens just 502 
being used in a tokenistic way within the initial stages of policy planning by governments. 503 
 504 
Conclusion 505 
This paper has examined how CSS can offer a fruitful way of contributing to more integrative 506 
and effective climate action and policy that moves beyond the traditional science-policy 507 
model. We have discussed a framework for CSS followed by potential barriers and solutions. 508 
With respect to the barriers mentioned above, a sub-set of citizens and policy-makers across 509 
the board will have to work hard to create arenas where existing power asymmetries can be 510 
suspended through institutions, venues and gatherings that permit a rough ‘communicative 511 
equality’. 512 
 513 
We argue that the barriers to CSS are not insurmountable and CSS can truly catalyze 514 
transformative change if citizens and policy-makers can become more aligned through 515 
processes of social knowing, especially at the local scale. By breaking down the tension 516 
between expertise and lay knowledge, experts and citizens can collaboratively explore 517 
alternative social contexts outside of traditional science (Blue, 2015). This could then catalyze 518 
the co-production of alternative policies between citizens, scientists and policy-makers that 519 
address emerging climate issues in specific communities. Bridging citizens, scientists and 520 
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governments through a CSS narrative framework that increases recognition of human qualities 521 
and needs would help reconfigure formal climate policy-making through the democratic 522 
systems already in place. Taking this transformative pathway places greater responsibility for 523 
tackling climate change in the hands of citizens, consistent with the principles of democratic 524 
governance and democratic legitimacy. However, governments, the private sector, the IPCC, 525 
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